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HOW RELIABLE IS MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW? A
REVIEW OF "MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE
AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT
JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND
OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS" BY NEIL VIDMAR
(University of Michigan Press, 1995; published in paperback, 1997)
JEFFREY O'CONNELL21
CHRISTOPHER POHL
3
"It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data.'

In his book reviewed here Neil Vidmar adduces data which he maintains
validates jury judgments in medical malpractice litigation and, by extension,
invalidates criticisms of such litigation. The first point is questionable; the
second clearly wrong.
We begin by asking which of the following metaphors most aptly describes
the chief characteristics of medical malpractice litigation?
Imagine a two-dimensional Cartesian plane; now draw a diagonal line in the
plane; color the area to one side of the line red, the other blue; now smudge the
line a little. Finally, imagine that any point in the plane can be located by
reference to its coordinates along the X and Y axis. Assuming that a given point
is not located in the smudgy boundary area, our intuition tells us that it is
possible to determine the color of all the points surrounding our original
4
choice.

1Jeffrey O'Connell is the Samuel H. McCoy, II Professor of Law, University of
Virginia School of Law. B.A., Dartmouth College, 1951; J.D., Harvard University, 1954.
We are grateful to Professor Kenneth Abraham of the University of Virginia Law School
for his helpful suggestions (but of course he bears no responsibility for any inadequacies
in our effort).
2
Christopher Pohl, B.A., Hamilton College, 1991; J.D., University of Virginia School
of Law, 1997.
3
OXFORD DICTIONARYOF QUOTATIONS 192 (3d ed. 1979),
DOYLE, THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES (1893).

quoting SIR ARTHUR CONAN

4
This metaphor, as well as the "snowflake" metaphor to follow, are taken from a
provocative essay by William Meadow and John D. Lantos, Expert Testimony, Legal
Reasoning, and Justice: The Casefor Adopting a Data-BasedStandardof Care in Allegation of
Medical Negligence in the NICU, in 23.3 CLINics IN PERINATOLOGY 583 (Sept. 1996). The
authors propose that in cases of alleged medical negligence, experts should testify
regarding the standard of care that is ordinarily used in similar circumstances; that

standard, in turn, can be determined a priori by acquiring data concerning the care used
in a particular specialty. The authors suggest that experts whose testimony is based
on data determined prior to trial and not in anticipation of litigation should be afforded
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In law and mathematics, there is an established notion that if the outcome
of a particular case is known, then the outcomes of cases with closely related
facts should be similarly decided: in other words, once one determines the color
of one point, its neighboring points ought to be the same color. The process by
which the law arrives at these conclusions is called analogic reasoning, or
reasoning by example, 5 and is the central organizing principle6 of any rational
7
legal system.
What if, instead of a neatly bisected Cartesian plane, medical negligence
findings resembled nothing so much as a Madlebrot figure: a red snowflake
inscribed on a blue Cartesian plane, with smaller red snowflakes extending off
the main figure in every direction?8 For any point in such a figure, an infinite
number of near neighbors would exist that are either blue or red. The
implications for a judicial system that produces such results are obvious: if any
chosen neighboring point may be a different color-if cases that are virtually
indistinguishable on the facts may be differently decided-then that system
violates the basic premise of analogic reasoning.9
Many advocates of reforming the manner in which medical malpractice
claims are evaluated in the United States argue that the current system
produces results whose chief characteristics are uncertainty and
unpredictability.O Needless to say, proponents of tort law do not believe the
current system produces results that, when plotted, resemble Mandelbrot
figures. But with imperfect (or often nonexistent) data on hand, each side is too
often reduced to making blanket assertion after blanket assertion that juries are
or are not competent to decide medical malpractice cases, that damage awards

greater weight than experts who provide "anecdotal" evidence regarding negligent

medical care. Id.
5

See generally EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING, 2 (1949).

6

See generally EDWARD LEvI, AN INTRODUCrION TO LEGAL REASONING at 2 (1949),

quoted in Meadow and Lantos, supra note 5, at 584.
7
See Meadow and Lantos, supra note 5, at 584:
1. Similarity is seen between cases (points are determined to be

neighbors).
2. The rule of law inherent in the first case is announced (the color

of the original point is determined).
3. The rule of law is made applicable to the second case (the color
of the neighboring point is constrained).
8

1d. at 584. According to Meadow and Lantos, "[t]hisvision is an accurate (although
incomplete) description of one member of what is commonly referred to as a Mandelbrot
set: a collection of geometric figures arising from the solutions of a class of nonlinear

functions ....
"rd.
9
10

Id. at 585.
See generally, PETER

HUBER, LIABILITY:

THE LEGAL REVOLUTION

AND ITS

CONSEQUENCES (1988); WALTER OLSEN, THE LITIGATION ExPLOSION (1991); PAUL WEILER,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991).
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are or are not inflated. Randall Bovbjerg of The Urban Institute sums up the
situation as follows: "Folklore, anecdote, and stereotypes predominate [the tort
reform debate] partly because solid information has been scarce for many
years."11
Duke University Law Professor Neil Vidmar's, book, "Medical Malpractice
and the American Jury," purports to provide the medical malpractice reform
debate with the kind of hard data it has been lacking for years. 12 Vidmar's
purpose is to examine empirically the claims that malpractice juries deviate
extensively from medical standards, and that they are a primary culprit behind
the spiraling costs and inefficiencies that plague the American health care
13
system.
Vidmar makes three arguments. One, juries do not often find in favor of
plaintiffs who bring medical malpractice claims. Two, jury findings of
negligence are not the result of sympathetic bias arising out of the severity of
injury suffered by the plaintiff. Three, damage awards-particularly
noneconomic damage awards such as "pain and suffering"-are not rising
dramatically, and juries do not typically sock it to "deep pocket" defendants
like insurance companies. To the contrary, Vidmar argues that in the cases he
studied in North Carolina and elsewhere, damages are generally proportional
to the seriousness of the injury and are not often far above independent
estimates of a patient's economic loss. 14 And for the occasional jury that goes
astray with respect to its verdict on liability or on damages, Vidmar argues that
a number of post-verdict legal mechanisms operate to correct and adjust trial
errors. 15
These findings lead Vidmar to suggest that further efforts at tort reform are
unnecessary. Vidmar clearly believes his conclusions should go a long way
toward deflating critics of the tort system: "They have identified the
malpractice jury as a central villain in the tort system.... [11f one of their major
premises is wrong we need to look very critically at the rest of their
arguments." 16 Vidmar dismisses recommendations such as the American
Medical Association's suggestion that juries be replaced by an administrative

1

lRandall Bovbjerg, Medical Malpractice: Research and Reform, 79 VA. L. REV. 2155,

2185 (1993).
12

Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpracticeand the American jury: Confronting the Myths About
Jury Incompetence, Deep Pockets,and OutrageousDamageAwards, 28 SuFFOLK UNIV. L. REv.
205(1995).
131d. at 8. "This book's organizing theme is the extent to which malpractice juries
deviate from legal norms and, if so, for what reasons." Id.
14

1d. at 266.

15Id.
16Vidmar, supra note 12, at 273.
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system of neutral doctors in determining medical malpractice claims, 17 since
18
juries on average do a good job of determining whether care was negligent.
In reply to all this in the first place, the civil jury is not in danger of being
replaced in medical malpractice cases, and it is not clear that it ever was. While
some juries have undoubtedly returned some questionable verdicts (or worse),
and have been criticized in the popular press for it,19 one can concede that juries
perform their job reasonably well in medical malpractice cases--especially
given the murky nature of alleged causation and misconduct as well as the
often (wildly) conflicting testimony of dueling medical experts-without for a
moment endorsing tort law's handling of medical malpractice cases.
Instead, it is the nature of the tort system itself in medical malpractice cases,
which requires both a finding of fault and computing the monetary value of
nonmonetary loss as a legal precondition to compensatory relief for injured
patients, that justifies the criticism of current medical malpractice law.20 Tort
law has long been seen as perversely ineffective and inefficient in providing
compensation, particularly in the context of medical malpractice. In the words
of Harvard Law School Professor Paul Weiler:

17

This approach has not garnered any support before Congress or state legislatures.
See id. at 161-62.
181d. at 265. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see infra pp. 11-17.
19d.at 11-12. Vidmar calls these anecdotes "tort tales"-cases such as the oft-told tale
of the "burglar" who sued a school system after he fell through a skylight, winning
damages of $206,000 plus $1,500 per month for life. As Vidmar points out, these tort
tales are consistently invoked to insist on jury restraint and a return to "common sense,"
despite the fact that the tales are often either misleading or flat-out wrong on the facts
of a particular case. Another oft-told case involving the psychic and her CAT scan
likewise refuses to die. The facts of the actual case on which the story is based, Haimes
v. Hart, show that, while the plaintiff did bring a $1 million claim that a CAT scan made
her lose her psychic abilities, she had also sustained permanent brain damage due to an
allergic reaction to a contrast dye that she claimed was negligently administered prior
to her CAT scan. The judge instructed the jury to disregard the claim concerning the
loss of psychic abilities and consider only the evidence on brain damage. Despite the
fact that the true story regarding the lawsuit was published in the National Law Journal
in 1987, the inaccurate version appeared in a report by Vice President Quayle's Council
on Competitiveness in 1991, in books published in 1991 by Peter Huber and Walter
Olsen, and in a 1993 article by Newsweek. Id. at 12. See generallyPresident's Council on
Competitiveness,A Reportfrom the President'sCouncil on Competitiveness: Agenda for Civil
Justice Reform (1991), at 5; PIr"R HuER, GALILEO's REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM (1991); OLSEN, supra note 10.
20

"In medical malpractice cases the legal guideline is whether the physician's
treatment of the patient comported with the standards of professional practice followed
by other physicians in the same field of medical practice in that community at the time
that the injury occurred." Vidmar, supra note 12, 123-24. In other words, what would'a
reasonable doctor under the particular circumstances have done? See id., at 123-26
(providing the general reader with an excellent summary of the varying standards by
which medical malpractice is judged).
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Viewed as a form of insurance, the malpractice regime has major
flaws.... [TIort benefits are doled out in a rather arbitrary manner to
some-but not most-deserving victims, and also to those... who are
not even "deserving" within tort law's fault-based frame of reference.
Even worse, to make payment to the relative handful... who do
surmount the natural and legal barriers to demonstrating legal
entitlement to damages, the medical malpractice system must spend
an inordinate amount of both time... and money... litigating whether
21
the doctor was at fault so that the victim can be compensated.
While Vidmar does manage to present a number of quotes from popular
legal authors who have lashed out at triers of fact, including juries,22 critics of
medical malpractice law need not base their displeasure with the present
system on "jury incompetence;" instead one can indict other manifest
inefficiencies of the present system as explained above. In acquitting the
medical malpractice jury of judicial negligence, Vidmar purports to exonerate
23
a factor not by any means crucial to the failures of the medical liability system.
Lawyer and author Philip Howard notes, "If Vidmar's goal is to show that the
jury system is not the main culprit in a flawed judicial system, then he has
proven his point: Jurors do not generally check their common sense at the jury
room door. As a practicing lawyer, I would go even further: It's amazing that,
in the vague and standardless world of malpractice claims, juries seem to get
24
things right."
In this review, we examine each of the findings made by Professor Vidmar,
and then compare those findings with other empirical examinations of medical
malpractice litigation in the United States, notably the most recent findings by
the Harvard Medical Practice Study.25 In addition, we will argue that the data

21

PauIC. Weiler, The Casefor No-FaultMedicalLiability, 52 MD. L. REv. 908,915(1993).

22

1n particular, Vidmar cites Huber and Olsen, supra note 10, as examples of legal
scholars who argue that juries too often view cases as opportunities to display boundless
generosity. ("But judges and juries were, for the most part, committed to running a
generous sort of charity. If the new tort system cannot find a careless defendant after an
accident, it will often settle for a merely wealthy one.") Huber, supra note 10, at 12.
23Ironically, by bolstering confidence injuries, Vidmar's work could in the long run
be helpful to the cause of medical malpractice reform by forcing advocates to spend less
time targeting politically expedient but ultimately disingenuous targets like
"incompetent" juries.
24

See Philip K. Howard, Review: Medical Malpractice and the American Jury, WASH.

MONTHLY, March 1, 1996, at 55.

25Troyan A. Brennan, ET AL., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the
Outcomes ofMedicalMalpracticeLitigation,335 NEW ENG. J.MED. 1963 (Dec. 26,1996). The
authors state: "Inthe multivariate analysis, disability (permanent vs. temporary or none)
was the only significant predictor of payment.... Neither the presence of an adverse
event due to negligence.., nor the presence of an adverse event of any type... was
associated with payment to the plaintiff." Id. at 1965. See notes 52 and 106 infra and
accompanying text.
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compiled so far continues to indicate that victims whose injuries arise from
medical maloccurrences, far from being well served by the present system as
Vidmar suggests, would be far better served by some variant of a no-fault
compensation scheme. 26

Vidmar's early chapters seek to disprove what he says is a prevailing myth
in American legal culture: the idea that doctors who get sued are routinely
found liable. While he sporadically attempts to include data gathered from
other states, Vidmar's claims are primarily derived from information found in
his own backyard: first, he surveyed every medical malpractice case filed in the
state and federal courts in North Carolina between July 1, 1984, and June 30,
1987, which constituted a total of 895 lawsuits. 27 In addition, Vidmar employs
a second sample involving cases filed in fourteen of North Carolina's 100
counties between July 1, 1987 and December thirty-one, 1990: a sample of 326
cases. Vidmar estimates that they constitute 52% of malpractice cases filed
during that period in North Carolina Superior Court (the state's court of
general jurisdiction).28
Of the 895 cases surveyed in North Carolina, approximately 50% were settled
with the plaintiff receiving money from the defendant. 29 According to Vidmar,
approximately 40% were dropped, either because the plaintiff withdrew the
claim, allowed it to lapse beyond procedural or statutory deadlines, or received
a judicial ruling that terminated the case in favor of the defendant. 30 Only 118
reached trial stage; and out of those, three were tried by a judge and thirty-one
otherwise did not make it to the jury: these cases either were settled after trial
had begun, were disposed of by a directed verdict, or were withdrawn by the
plaintiff.31 The remaining 84 trial cases eventually reaching the jury thus
constituted 9.4% of all cases filed in North Carolina from 1984 to 1987. The

26

See Jeffrey O'Connell, Two-tier Tort Law: Ned No-Faultand Quasi-CriminalLiability,
27 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 871 (1992). See also American Law Institute, Reporter's Study on
Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury, Chapter 15: Elective No Fault Medical
Liability, Vol. 11, 487-516 (1991) (drawing heavily on O'Connell's work), and notes 115-18
infra and accompanying text.
27
VIDMAR, supra note 12, at 23. Vidmar estimates that he captured approximately
95% of the cases filed during that period.
28
1d. Additional details on the survey are contained in Neil Vidmar ET AL., An
EmpiricalExaminationofa LegislatedProceduralReform: Court-BasedManagement ofMedical
MalpracticeLitigation (The Private Adjudication Center, Duke University School of Law,
1992).
29
1d. at 24.

30

1d.

31

Id.
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second study produced closely similar figures, 32 leading Vidmar to project that
between 7-10% of malpractice cases arguably eligible for jury determination
were decided that way
In the first study, seventeen plaintiffs-or 20%-prevailed, and in the second
study plaintiffs in four of the 25 trials-or 16%-prevailed. 33 In these 21 cases,
there were three awards of over $1 million,34 as well as an award for $750,000
and two for $300,000.35 However, the remainder of the trials produced much
smaller jury verdicts, such that while the mean award for the 21 cases in which
plaintiffs prevailed was $367,737, the median was just $36,500.36 Put differently,
whereas a plaintiff's expected value of going to trial (equal to the average
award when plaintiffs prevail, multiplied by the probability of obtaining a
verdict) yielded a figure of $70,849, 37 most plaintiffs in the study came away
with very modest awards: only nine out of 109 of the cases decided by juries
were awarded more than the expected value of their claims. 38 Furthermore,
plaintiffs see the size of that award shrink considerably after the lawsuit is over.
Says Vidmar: "Assuming,very conservatively, that expenses and fees averaged
$10,000 and that the attorney's share was 35%, or roughly $25,000, the plaintiff
who went to trial would expect to recover $35,849."39 Vidmar argues that the
infrequency of plaintiff wins, coupled with the modest size of the awards when
they do win, contradicts the popular belief that juries routinely return large
40
damage verdicts against doctors.

32

VIDMAR, supra note 12, at 24. In the second study conducted by Vidmar, which
covered the 1987-1990 time period, 51% of the 326 cases settled, 40% were dropped or
terminated without payment to plaintiff, and 9°/%went to trial. Of the thirty-two trial
cases, three were still pending at the end of data collection, two settled during trial, one
resulted in the judge directing the jury to return a verdict for the defendants, and one
was decided by a judge. Not including the three cases still pending, twenty-five cases,
or 7.7% of all malpractice suits, went before a jury. Id.
33[d.
34

1d. The exact amounts were for $1.28 million, $1 million, and $3.5 million.

35

Id.

36

1d.

37

VIDMAR, supra note 12, at 24. To calculate this figure, simply divide the total of all
awards in the sample ($7,722,488) by the total number of jury trials (109). Id.
38
1d. Expected value is defined as "equal to the average award when plaintiffs prevail
multiplied by the probability of obtaining a verdict." Id. For his discussion, Vidmar relies
on Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting To No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations
and the Selection of Cases For Trial, 90 MICH. L. REv. 319 (1991).

39VIDMAR, supra note 12, at 28. Vidmar cites Frank M. McClellan, MEDICAL

AND ETHIcs 102 (1994) at 102, who reported that assessing
the merits of a case in 1991 costs at least $2,000 and often $5000 to $10,000; if the case
goes to trial, expenses may total $50,000 to $75,000.
40
VIDMAR, supranote 12, at 35: "The fact that plaintiffs win only one case in five seems
to contradict the extreme claim that juries are prone to side with plaintiffs regardless of
MALPRACTICE: LAW, TACTICS,
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Vidmar's figures clearly show that plaintiffs who took their cases to trial did
not typically do well with juries, winning slightly less than one case in five.
When plaintiffs did receive an award it was usually for a modest amount of
money. Indeed, when examined in light of the time and effort expended by
plaintiffs attorneys in preparing the lawsuit, as well as the delay suffered by
the victim in obtaining compensation, it seems difficult to understand the
motivation to take these cases to trial at all. Vidmar explains the decision this
way: 'Trial cases are the residue of a complicated winnowing process involving
the interrelated decisions of many actors involved in the lawsuit. They are the
result of negotiation and settlement attempts that have failed. "41
How are the medical malpractice cases that go to trial different from the 90%
of cases that are settled? Using data from the 1984-87 North Carolina study,
Vidmar divided those cases that went to trial into five subgroups according to
severity of injury: emotional or minor injury, temporary disability, permanent
partial disability, permanent total disability, and death. 42 Vidmar found that
minor or emotional injuries accounted for only 5% of the cases, while
temporary disability accounted for 27%, permanent partial disability 39%,
43
permanent total disability 8%, and wrongful death cases 21%.
Vidmar then contrasted those findings with the percentage of cases that
resulted in (a) trial, (b) settlement with the plaintiff, and (c) no payment to the
plaintiff for each of the types of injury.44 As one might expect, the results
showed that jury trials occurred less frequently when the injured party suffered
only minor or emotional injury (9%) or temporary disability (7%), but occurred
more frequently when the injured suffered permanent total disability (13%) or
death (13%).45 Permanent partial disability cases fell in the middle, with trials
occurring in 10% of the cases.4 6 In minor or emotional and temporary disability
cases, 52% and 47% of claims, respectively, resulted in no payment to the
plaintiff.47 In contrast, only 19% of permanent total injuries and 31% of death

the evidence on liability. The statistics on awards suggest that the claim of jury
profligacy also may be overstated." Id.
41

M. at 82.

42

d. at 50. Emotional or minor injury was defined as "fright; temporary pain and
suffering; lacerations; contusions; minor scars; rashes; no delays in recovery."
Temporary disability was defined as "infection; miss set fracture; fall in hospital; bums;
surgical material left in body; drug side effect; delayed recovery." Permanent partial
disability was defined as "loss of fingers; damage to organs; deafness; loss of one limb,
eye, kidney, or lung." Permanent total disability was defined as "paraplegia; blindness;
loss of two limbs; brain damage; quadriplegia; lifelong care or fatal prognosis." Id.
431d. Vidmar found a similar pattern in the 1987-90 data set as well.
44
1d.
45

VIDMAR,supra note 12, at 50.

461d.
471d.
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injuries resulted in no payment. 48 According to Vidmar, "[slettlements occurred
with greater frequency in cases involving the most serious injuries, but
" 49
proportionately more jury trials of serious injuries occurred as well.
II.

If doctors who are sued are routinely found not liable, as Vidmar's studies
show, then what accounts for the medical profession's hostility towards the
legal system in general, and toward juries in particular? One theory, not
advanced by Vidmar, is that doctors' fear of the tort system stems from the
unpredictability of its imposition. The 1988 report of the American Medical
Association's Specialty Society Medical Liability Project summarizes concerns
about the competence of the jury:
Juries are not optimally suited to decide the complicated issues of
causation and duty of care. Under the best of circumstances, the
determination of professional liability is not easily made by laymen.
With respect to the major elements of liability-duty of care and
causation-the parties almost always must present expert testimony,
which the jurors cannot evaluate independently.
[Jiuries can never be as effective at deciding these cases as specialized
hearing officers because jurors are exposed to the medical issues only
once and thus they cannot develop an institutional memory to aid
them in deciding a specific dispute. This not only impairs their ability
each case, but it also leads to inconsistency in verdicts across
to decide
5
cases. 0

Critics of the jury system argue that the system is too random to secure the
twin goals of the tort system: corrective justice and deterrence. 51 Doctors and
other health care providers may be held responsible for plaintiffs' losses when
they should not be-outcomes we refer to as "false positives." However, many
defendants may be held not responsible for plaintiffs' losses when they should
be-outcomes known as "false negatives." As all involved in the litigation
process struggle to avoid false positives or false negatives, long delays and
huge transaction costs result. These delays and transaction costs are felt acutely
52
by both plaintiffs and doctors caught in the midst of this uncertain process.
One commentator put it this way: "[Dioctors aren't irrational. They're scared
48

Id.

49

1d.

50

American Medical Association (AMA) Specialty Society Medical Liability Project,
A ProposedAlternative to the Civil JusticeSystem for Resolving Medical Liability Disputes: A
Fault-BasedAdministrativeSystem 8 (1988), cited in VrDMAR, supra note 12, at 122.
51
See generallyMichael Saks, MedicalMalpractice:FacingReal Problemsand FindingReal
Solutions, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 693,722-25 (1994).
52

See O'Connell, supranote 26, at 871.

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 12:359

because they believe the system is random. Most people don't like to play
Russian roulette, even if the odds of getting the bullet are only one in 200. Those
are the odds of a test pilot, not a caregiver."53
Is the present system successful in ferreting out actual cases of doctor
malfeasance? Or are lawsuits merely an "expensive sideshow,' 54 a cumbersome
method of income redistribution for severely disabled patients? Evidence is
growing that there is a poor correlation between injuries caused by negligent
medical treatment and malpractice litigation. At the beginning of his discussion
of jury competence on liability questions, Vidmar describes a study conducted
in the mid-1980's where a team of researchers at the University of Minnesota
studied 220 obstetrics cases that resulted in malpractice claims. Each case was
reviewed by five obstetricians. 55 The experts who reviewed cases concluded
that common obstetrical risks were recognized and recorded in medical records
only 54% of the time, and the attending physicians correctly managed the risk
factors only 32% of the time. 56 The study also concluded, however, that
lawsuits occurred in more than 30% of cases in which the risks were
appropriately managed. 57
These findings are similar to those made by the famous Harvard Medical
Practice Study, a sample of 31,000 patients treated in fifty-one New York State
hospitals during 1984.58 The hospitals were a representative sample of the
state's acute-care, nonpsychiatric hospitals. 59 The study carefully oversampled
high-risk patients and undersampled low-risk patients, and weighted them so
that the sampled cases could be extrapolated to the state's 2.6 million hospital
patients that year.60

The study found that there was a poor correlation between a malpractice suit
and the presence of actual malpractice. In their examination of the hospital
records of the 31,000 patients, the authors found 280 negligent adverse events
inflicted on the patient sample. The authors then report the "key finding" that
of forty-seven patients filing malpractice claims as a result of their hospitaliza-

53

Howard, supra note 24.

54

See infra note 108 and accompanying text. See also Susan Okie, Who Wins Medical
Malpractice Cases? Study Suggests DecidingFactor Is Not Merit, but Whether PlaintiffWas

PermanentlyDisabled, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1997, at C,discussing the latest findings of

the Harvard Medical Practice Study, supranote 25.
55
Thomas M. Julian, ET AL., Investigation of Obstetric MalpracticeClosed Claims: Profile
of Event, 2 AM. J. PERINATOLOGY 320-24 (1985), cited in VrDMaR, supra note 12, at 121.
56

1d.

57

Id.

58

Brennan, ET AL., supra note 25. The study was ultimately put into book form. See

PAUL WEILER, ET AL., A MEASURE OF MALPRACTICE (1993).
59

WEILER, supra note

60

1d. at 40.

58, at x-xi.
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tion,61 only eight were brought by'the 280 patients who had been negligently
injured. 62 "Expressed in the form of ratios calculated from the sampling
weights, the chances that a claim would be filed by a patient with an identifiable
negligent injury was... only 1 in 50."63 The authors then go on to say that a
more accurate ratio of what we term "false negatives" falls between one in
fifteen and one in thirty instances of malpractice 6 4 -still a staggeringly high
number of actionable malpractice suits that could be brought but are not. The
Harvard data put the ratio of erroneous filings of malpractice claims to
erroneous non-filings at roughly one to seven (thirty-nine to 272)65-in other
words, for every doctor or hospital against whom an invalid claim is filed, there
are seven claims that could be filed but are not.66 Not emphasized by the
authors, but also important, was the data's flip side-that of the forty-seven
claims filed, few demonstrated any actual negligence, and many demonstrated
67
no discernable injury.
These studies remind us that medical negligence does indeed occur-with
often disastrous results. But what are policy-makers to do with such data? The
empirical assumption underlying the American Medical Association's
criticisms of juries in malpractice cases is that neutral doctors would decide
cases differently-i.e., less randomly-than do juries.68 In 1992, the Physicians
Payment Review Commission stated bluntly: "physicians probably apply the
standard [of negligence] differently than do juries."69
But Vidmar questions the baseline against which jury decisions are
condemned. In the first place, while Vidmar recognizes that there is not a
perfect match between lawsuits and negligence, he labors over the course of
sixty pages to demonstrate that many, perhaps most, malpractice suits are not
technically complex, and that jurors are just as capable as anyone else-doctors
included-of determining liability: "[M]alpractice cases do not hinge solely on

61

1d. at 71.

62

1d. at 73,

631d.
64

WEILER, supra note 58,

at 74-75.

65 1d. at 73.
66
67

68

69

For a more thorough analysis on these points, see Saks, supra note 51, at 702-04.
WEILER ET AL., supra note 58, at 71: "[Of those 47,]
10 claims involved hospitalization that had produced injuries, though
not due to provider negligence; and another three cases exhibited
some evidence of medical causation, but not enough to pass our
probability threshold. That left 26 malpractice claims, more than half the
total of 47 in our sample, which provided no evidence of medical injury, let
alone medical negligence." (emphasis added)
VIDMAR,

supra note 12, at 161-62.

Annual Report of the Physician Payment Review Commission: 1992, at 186, cited in

VIDMAR, Supra note

12, at 162.
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technical matters that are beyond the scope and comprehension of laypersons
(emphasis added)."70 To prove his point, Vidmar relies heavily on "case studies"
of five malpractice trials which took place in North Carolina between 1987 and
1990. Of these, Vidmar describes three as not complicated. 7 1 A patient who
suffered from urinary incontinence did not improve after her doctor performed
a supposedly ameliorative procedure;7 2 a mother whose breech baby suffered
from oxygen deprivation during delivery sued her doctor for incorrectly
estimating the duration of her pregnancy; 73 the husband of a woman who died
from a puncture wound caused by an enema tip sued for wrongful death. 74
Vidmar then discusses two "complicated" case studies-trials which involved
highly technical medical issues or complications and resulted in substantial
jury disagreement. 75 These included a suit by a woman who became
permanently blind due to a late diagnosis of a blood clot in her brain, 76 and a
suit by the estate of a man who died from a reaction to contrast dye
administered to perform a CT scan. 77 Afterwards, Vidmar interviewed the
jurors about their understanding of the evidence and their attitudes toward the
trial and its participants. 78
In discussing this research, Vidmar points out that, as a rule, a plaintiff can
succeed in a malpractice action only if expert testimony supports a finding that
the defendant doctor failed to follow the customary or accepted practice then
prevailing in the relevant specialty or discipline. 79 Vidmar uses his first three
case studies to make the point that malpractice suits often revolve around
conflicting testimony of witnesses between patients and doctors or between
medical personnel, not complicated causation questions.80 In cases such as

70

VIDMAR, supranote 12, at 157.

71

id. at 142: "1would argue that [the three cases] were not beyond the intellectual
competence of the group ability of 12 jurors." Id.
72
d. at 127-32.
73

d. at 132-37.

74 Id. at 137-42.
75

V[DMAR,

supranote 12, at 145.

76

d. at 145-49.

77

d. at 151-55.

78

1d. at 149-51 (blood clot), Id. at 155-57 (CT scan).

79

1d. at 123-24: "In medical malpractice cases the legal guideline is whether the
physician's treatment of the patient comported with the standards of professional
practice followed by other physicians in the same field of medical practice in that
community at the time that the injury occurred." See also WEILER, supranote 10, at 19.
80
Vidmar, supra note 12, at 141-44. ("My own conclusion from the research described
in this chapter is that a prima facie argument can be made that there is nothing so
extraordinary in many of the cases that most or all of a group of 12 laypersons could
not understand them. In some the issue of negligence, or its absence, is pretty
straightforward. In others, the primary issue revolves around the credibility of patients
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these, jurors are well qualified to make determinations as to witness
credibility-a juror, for instance, does not need to be able to decipher complex
medical data to know that a doctor who dates a pregnancy primarily by the
last menstrual period was violating a recognized duty of care and should be
81
held liable.
As for the two "complicated" trials, Vidmar suggests that contrary to the
AMA's position, experts are no better than juries at deciding questions of
liability. 82 Vidmar argues that for medically complex cases, doctors themselves
cannot often agree on whether the medical care given in a particular case is
appropriate. In addition, jury findings of negligence are not the result of
spontaneous eruptions of sympathy for the injured plaintiff; Vidmar finds "no
support for the hypothesis that juries are prone to find doctors liable simply
when the plaintiff's injuries are severe."83 These "complicated" trials are
disproportionately more likely to revolve around ambiguous evidence, so
"there is often no clear or uncontestable criterion by which jury performance
may be judged." 84 Therefore, there can be no definitive answer to the question
of whether juries "get it right" since, "in the end, legal negligence is a matter of
human judgment." 85
To test whether juror intuitions track those of neutral doctors regarding
questions of negligence, Vidmar discusses at length a study based on data
obtained from the New Jersey Medical Insurance Exchange, a

versus doctors about what occurred and when. In still others, good lawyers and experts
appear capable of educating laypersons about complex matters"). Vidmar explains
away the inconsistency and unpredictability in the tort trial process by suggesting that
perhaps it is the quality and quantum of evidence that lawyers presented to juries, and
not juror incompetence, that best explains variability in jury awards. Id. at 260 ("If
evidence on damages differs from trial to trial, differences in awards should be ascribed
to the fault of the trial process or the parties involved, not the jurors"). There is another,
more damning, way to view Vidmar's alternative explanation for jury variability. See
Neil Vidmar, Papand Circumstance:What Jury Verdicts Tell Us About Jury Behavior and the
Tort System, 28 SuFFoLK U.L. REV. 1205 (1994). In this article, Vidmar cites interviews
with lawyers that indicate that they "try cases differently depending on whether the fact
finder is a jury or a judge." Id. at 1221. In particular, "[alttorneys indicate that in bench
trials they presented every relevant detail of the case, whereas in jury trials they culled
the evidence, abbreviated it, and presented it in a different manner." Id. For Vidmar, this
implies that judges and juries may "simply have been responding to different evidence."
Id. But what accounts for the culling and abbreviation of relevant evidence may be a
factor that itself correlates with jury incompetence. Perhaps lawyers (who presumably
know what they are doing) are presenting a lesser quantum of evidence in response to
what they justifiably perceive as juries' inability to understand complex medical issues.
See also note 119, infra.
81 VIDMAR,supra note 12, at 136-37.
82

1d. at 161.

83

1d. at 164.

841d. at 175.
85

1d.
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physician-owned insurance company that provides liability insurance to
approximately 60% of New Jersey's doctors.8 6 In the New Jersey study, "each
claim filed against a doctor was assessed internally by the insurance company
according to whether the doctor's actions were consistent with prevailing
standards of medical care."87 The evaluation was designed to provide a neutral
assessment of possible negligence, so that the insurance company could decide
whether to contest liability.88 "If the physician admitted error to the insurance
company, the case was labeled "indefensible-insurer admits deviation [from
standard of care]." 89 If the physician claimed no error, the insurance company
asked a doctor from the same medical specialty to conduct a review of the case,
and this physician-reviewer discussed the case with a claims representative
from the insurance company, a defense attorney, and the defending physician.
In this way, the authors purported to classify each of the cases as either
"indefensible," "defensible," or "unclear."90 The results: 62% of the cases were
classified as "defensible," 25% "indefensible," and 13% "unclear."91
The authors then further classified each case into three categories according
to severity of injury: low, 92 medium, 93 and high. 94 Injury severity was low in
28% of the cases, medium in 47%, and high in 25%. Jury trials took place in 15%
of the above cases classified as defensible, 5% of cases classified as indefensible,
and 10% where defensibility was unclear. All told, jury trials accounted for 12%,
or 988, of the 8,231 cases. Plaintiffs won 24% of the trials, with awards ranging
from $3,281 to $2,576,377. The median award was $114,170. 95

86

VIDMAR, supra note 12, at pp. 162-64, discussing Mark Taragin ET AL., The Influence
of Standardof Care and Severity ofInjury on the Resolution ofMedical MalpracticeClaims, 117
ANNALSOF INTERNAL MEDICINE 780 (1992). The database relied on by Taragin consisted
of 8,231 closed medical malpractice cases occurring between 1977 and 1992. Id.
87
88
89

VIDMAR, supra note 12, at 163.
1d.
!d. For a more detailed discussion, see Taragin ETAL, supra note 86, at 780.

90

1d. Taragin, supra note 86, at 781, explains that the unclear category was used when
the reviewing physician could not clearly state whether the standard of care was
violated or when a panel of reviewers disagreed about whether it was violated. Id.
9 1
VIDMAR, supra note 12, at 163. In neurosurgery and orthopedics cases, where
experts historically have held divergent opinions about the appropriate approach to
medical problems, a panel of physicians reviewed the case. See Taragin, supra note 86,
at 781.
92
VIDMAR, supra note 12, at 163. "Low" injury was defined as no, minor, or temporary
disability.

93

1d. "Medium" injury was defined as a major injury with temporary disability.

94

!d. "High" injury category involved grave injuries, brain injury with impaired life
expectancy, and death.
95

1d.
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The study compares these awards with the above-mentioned insurance
company categorization of negligence and severity. Of greatest interest to
Vidmar was the study's finding that jury verdicts on liability were positively
96
and significantly related to the neutral physicians' assessments of negligence.
Moreover, according to Vidmar, "the study found no support for the hypothesis
that juries are prone to find doctors liable simply when the plaintiff's injuries
97
are severe.'
What is one to make of this combination of anecdotal and empirical
evidence? Even the harshest critic of the tort system might well concede the
validity of Vidmar's assertion that malpractice cases do not hinge solely on
technical matters that are beyond the scope and comprehension of laypersons.
Though case studies may strike one as a less satisfactory method of examining
the tort system than the empirical studies Vidmar used to discuss plaintiff-win
rates, Vidmar believes that "the [case] studies do show the evidentiary and legal
diversity of medical negligence trials, and they produce a profile of how the
juries responded to specific issues. " 98 If the point of including the case studies
was to show that many malpractice cases are not technically complex, the point
would have been made more powerfully if Vidmar had selected the cases
randomly and not for illustrative purposes. 99 Indeed the case studies arguably
do not "show" anything-at least not anything beyond themselves. 100
But Vidmar then commingles his case studies with his empirical data to form
together the basis of his argument that jurors understand the "technical matters
of medicine," and can impose findings of negligence consistently (or, at least,
riot randomly). It is sometimes difficult to square this conclusion with the
evidence Vidmar himself presents. He discusses a study which finds that even
in a context when doctors were asked to give neutral, unbiased judgments
about 252 malpractice actions brought against a hospital, the doctors could
provide no clear answer regarding negligence in 30.6% of the cases. 101 Vidmar
notes this study as proof that experts are no better at determining negligence
than jurors, but it tends also to make a very different point-and one far more
significant than one relating only to jury competence. As Philip Howard notes,

9

61d. at 164. See also Taragin, supra note 86, at 781.

97

VIDMAR, supra note 12, at 164. "The severity of the plaintiff's injury was not
correlated with the probability that the plaintiff would win."
98

1d. at 160.
991d.
100Id. at 157. These cases do not conclusively demonstrate that jurors were able to
capably render appropriate verdicts on the "technical elements of medicine." Id. While
it is clear that Vidmar tried to talk to all of the jurors involved in the case study trials, it
is unclear how much weight these post-trial discussions should be afforded in light of
Vidmar's inability to speak to many jurors. Id.
101 Henry Farber and Michelle White, MedicalMalpractice:An Empirical Examinationof
the Litigation Process, 22 RAND J.ECON. 199-217 (1991), cited in VIDMAR, supra note 12, at
167.
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a possible one-third margin of error scarcely encourages confidence in the
102
negligence criterion we use to judge those charged with taking care of us.
In addition, some of the conclusions Vidmar reaches may need to be revised
in light of recent publications mentioned above. Vidmar cites the New Jersey
study in concluding that jury findings of negligence are not the result of
sympathetic bias arising out of injury suffered by the plaintiffs. 103 According
to Vidmar, "There appears to be no relationship between the severity of the
plaintiff's injury and verdicts for the plaintiff, refuting the claim that sympathy
for injured persons causes jurors to ignore the legal issues bearing on
negligence." 104 However, the New Jersey study itself recognized that prior
studies had come up with different conclusions as to whether the degree of
patient injury influences the probability of plaintiff payment. 105
In this connection, the Harvard Medical Practice Study has even more
recently analyzed how accurately malpractice litigation lead to payment. As in
the New Jersey study, the authors reviewed confidential medical records to
determine the insurers' honest assessment of the patients' injuries. The study's
102

Howard, supra note 24.

3

10 See text at supra note 86, et seq. Vidmar mentions a second study by Farber and
White that reaches the same conclusion regarding sympathetic bias, see Henry Farber
and Michelle White, A Comparison of Formal and Informal Dispute Resolution in Medical
Malpractice,23 J. LEGAL STUDIEs 777 (1994), cited in VIDMAR, supra note 12, at 167. In an
expanded version of their earlier study, the authors find no relationship between
winning and the severity of the plaintiff's injury. But Vidmar himself points out that
Farber and White relied upon a very small sample of jury trials to reach their conclusion.
Id. But see note 106 infra and accompanying text.
10 4

VIDMAR,

supra note 12, at 173. See also text at note 97.

105

See Taragin, supra note 86, at 782. The authors cite the following studies to
demonstrate that the findings on this question are inconsistent: General Accounting
Office, Medical Malpractice:No Agreement on the Problem or Solutions (1986); F.W. Cheney
ET AL., Standardof Careand Anesthesia Liability, 261 JAMA, 1599 (1989); R. Bovbjerg ET AL.,

Obstetricsand Malpractice:Evidence on the Performanceof a Selective No-fault System, 265
JAMA, 2836 (1991); F.A. Sloan & C.R. Hsieh, Variability in MedicalMalpracticePayments:
Is the CompensationFair? 24 L. & Soc'y REv. 997 (1990).
Vidmar has been criticized for his failure to mention prominent studies elsewhere.
See, Frank P. Grad, Review: Medical Malpractice and the American Jury: Confronting the
Myths About Jury Incompetence, Deep Pockets, and Outrageous Damage Awards by Neil
Vidmar, 335 NEw ENG. J.MED., July 11, 1996, at 139-40.
In 1973, the great study of medical malpractice by the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare was published (it is not cited by
Vidmar). This report found that relatively few physicians are sued
for malpractice and that of the lawsuits that do go to trial, most end
in verdicts for the physician. But physicians fear such suits because
they are a professional threat and a personal ordeal. The current system
of private malpractice actions does not adequately control the professional behavior of physicians. But medical-malpractice boards nationwide have a poor record of enforcing professional discipline, and
malpractice actions have become the only available disciplinary
instrument.
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findings indicate that in malpractice claims, only the severity of the patient's
disability, not negligence or even the occurrence of an injury caused by medical
care, was statistically significant in predicting whether a plaintiff would receive
payment. 106
From its previous study, the Harvard authors identified 51 litigated claims
and followed them over a ten-year period. Of the 51 malpractice cases, 46 had
been closed as of December 31, 1995. Among those cases, 10 of 24 that were
originally identified as involving no adverse event were settled, with a mean
payment of $28,760; six of 13 cases classified as involving adverse events but
no negligence were settled, with a mean payment of $98,192. By the same token,
five of nine cases in which adverse events due to negligence were found were
settled, with a mean payment of $66,944, while almost every claim involving
permanent disability-seven of eight-were settled for the plaintiffs, with a
mean payment of $201,250. The authors conclude, "Among the malpractice
claims we studied, the severity of the patient's disability, not the occurrence of
an adverse event or an adverse event due to negligence, was predictive of
payment to the plaintiff ."107 As one writer on seeing these findings put it: "If
the permanence of a disability, not the fact of negligence, is the reason for
compensation, the determination of negligence may be an expensive
sideshow." 108
The authors conclude that other random factors influence the decision to
settle, apart from the severity of injury:
Our review uncovered examples of the 'art' of litigation. In some cases
there were substantial settlements only because the physicians would
have made poor witnesses; in others, there was a tenacious defense
even though negligence was privately acknowledged; and in still
others, the cases were prolonged as part of a legal strategy. Such
maneuvers are accepted as part of the art of litigation. Nonetheless,
they raise questions about whether tort law is the most effective system
of compensating injured patients and creating rational mechanisms of
preventing injuries. 109
In other words, the question is not whether there are some elements of the tort
system which are defensible (the approach Vidmar appears to take), but
whether, taken as a whole, the present system is a defensible means of
compensating injured people. If the Harvard study is near the mark, the answer
is a resounding no.

1 06

BRENNAN Er AL., supra note 25, at 1963-67.

1 07

1d. at 1963.

108

Peter Huber, Easy Lawsuits Make Bad Medicine, FORBES, Apr. 21, 1997, at 166.
109BRENNAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 1967.

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 12:359

III.
Unlike the Harvard study, Vidmar blames a number of disparate forces,
including the mass media, legal scholars, doctors, and the "tort reform"
movement, for the public's dim view of the tort system." 0 Admittedly, doctors'
views on medical malpractice juries and the need for tort reform are influenced
by the fact that they are the targets of medical malpractice lawsuits and are
forced to pay the (sometimes extraordinarily high) cost of medical malpractice
insurance. When Vidmar presents evidence to medical groups that juries in
medical malpractice cases get it right most of the time, Vidmar describes the
typical reaction from most doctors as one of incredulity, followed closely by an
offer of contrary anecdotal evidence. But Vidmar argues there is more than
self-interest at work: in advocating medical malpractice reform, doctors are
"seeking social support for a symbolic reaffirmation of their role and
importance in society."111 As such, he argues, the medical profession is
particularly likely to find anecdotal evidence regarding jury incompetence
believable, with empirical data purporting to disprove jury incompetence
112
perceived as a direct attack on their profession.
Vidmar goes on to argue the "tort reform" movement-a loose confederation
of the insurance industry, corporate and professional organizations (including
the AMA), and conservative political groups-frequently attempts to create a
negative image of juries in the minds of the public and legislators in order to
advance its political agenda: "[tihe fact that the jury is composed of laypersons
rather than professionals makes it vulnerable to appeals to "common sense"
that it cannot be competent."11 3 To be fair, Vidmar notes that opponents of tort
reform are themselves hardly paradigms of honesty: in a typical, "pox on both
your houses" paragraph, Vidmar states: "'tort reform' is a political struggle in
which both sides engage in lobbying and propaganda that contain some
11 4
element of real problems, half-truths, and outright distortions."
Our basic premise is that one does not need to be a partisan of defendants
to believe the common law tort system as applied to malpractice injuries
malfunctions on such a scale that any authority-state or federal-with
colorable jurisdiction over it should be encouraged to reform it. But the changes
should not be, as Vidmar rightly suggests, of the type already enacted or
proposed at the behest of defense interests or by legislatures, state or federal.
ll0VIDMAR,supra note

12, at 266.

"'11d. at 268. For a conclusion that statistics support doctors' argument that liability
insurance is unavailable or unaffordable, see F. Patrick Hubbard, The Physician'sPoint
of View Concerning Medical Malpractice: A Sociological Perspective on the Symbolic
Importance of "Tort Reform", 23 GA. L. REv. 295, 296-97 (1989).
2
I1 VIDMAR, supra note 12, at 268. "When I have presented some of my findings to
medical groups, a common response, at least initially, has been incredulity supported
by the telling of anecdotes about doctors who have been sued." Id.
1131d. at 270.
1141d.
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Those changes uniformly weigh in on the side of defendants by either making
it harder for claimants tobe paid (e.g., by restrictive changes in joint and several
liability) or to pay them less when they are paid (e.g., by capping awards for
pain and suffering and/or punitive damages). They also do not make all that
much difference in changing the fortuity, delay and huge transaction costs of
determining (1) whose conduct was faulty or (2) the monetary value of
nonmonetary losses. Real, balanced tort reform should involve a fair trade, as
under no-fault workers' compensation laws, making it easier for victims with
arguably valid claims to be paid promptly but paying them less, thereby
lowering fortuity, delay and transaction costs. No-fault reform raises, though,
the possibly huge difficulties of ex ante definitions of medically adverse results
115
which are to be paid on a no-fault basis.
In response to these ex ante difficulties, the senior author of this article has
proposed an ex post "early offers/choice" plan, whereby any defendant in a
personal injury claim is given the option of offering to a claimant within 180
days after a claim is made periodic payment of the claimant's net economic
loss-relatively prompt payment compared to the tort system. 116 Such
payment will cover any medical expenses, including rehabilitation and wage
loss, beyond any collateral sources already payable to the claimant, plus a
reasonable hourly fee for the claimant's lawyer. (A minimum amount of, say,
$100,000 would be available under the offer to anyone suffering very serious
injury.) A defendant in a tort suit promptly offering to effect such an
open-ended major medical/disability policy paying economic losses to the
claimant forecloses further pursuit of a tort claim. In other words, the claimant
is forced to accept such an offer. Indeed, one might term the proposal, "Offers
that can't be refused." (Offers could be refused, however, and a tort claim for
both economic and noneconomic damages pursued, when the defendant's
misconduct was intentional or wanton, proved by clear and convincing
evidence.) Under this proposal, no defendant isforced to offer such a settlement;
this avoids imposing unmanageable new burdens on potential defendants
which a complete no-fault scheme for medical or product injuries, defined ex
ante, might well cause.
When would a defendant be inclined to make such an "early offer"? If after
examining the claim the defendant, for example, determines that the claimant
never was in its hospital, the defendant would obviously not offer to pay net
economic loss. But apart from such clear cases, even if the defendant thinks it
might be able to defeat a more arguable claim, it might also determine that it
is, after all, a claim by its patient for an adverse condition that clearly resulted
from a stay in defendant's hospital. Although the defendant may believe the
115

See O'Connell, supra note 26, at 881-82; RIcHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RuLEs FOR

104(1995); Michael Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-DeterrenceDilemma
of Modern North American Tort Law: CanadianPerspective on the Liability InsuranceCrisis,
COMPLEXWORLD,

24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 929,986-90 (1987); DON DEWEs ET AL., EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF

ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE FACTS SERIOUSLY 136 (1996).
116

0'Connell, supra note 26, at 883-85.
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adverse result was not its fault, it would calculate what it would cost to pay
the claimant periodically for his net medical expense and wage loss. If that sum
turns out to be less than what the defendant would pay to defense lawyers plus
its exposure to full-scale tort damages, including payment for non-economic
damages like pain and suffering, the defendant would arguably have found a
good trade.
Given the huge costs of defending tort cases and the gamble of having to pay
large sums for noneconomic losses, defendants would arguably be prompted
to offer economic losses not just in cases where they are sure to lose but even
in many-perhaps most-cases it now faces in which the issue of liability is in
doubt. One leading defense lawyer hypothesizes that of the 250 cases his large
office was then defending, all in various stages of litigation, he would advise
making an offer to pay claimants' net economic losses in 200 of them if such a
law came into effect.
The essence of this "neo no-fault" proposal is the opportunity for many
injured persons to obtain relatively fast payment for their economic losses,
while being able to make use of the full tort apparatus in egregious cases.
Incentives-but not requirements-are built to encourage early resolution of
tort disputes. The bill thereby attacks, within the tort system itself, the
grievously high burdens on all sides of resolving tort disputes. Nightmares of
compensation that is uncertain, inaccurate, underserved, delayed or denied are
dramatically reduced. Much of the tort system's deterrence is retained. In those
instances in which the defendant's behavior is clearly and grossly
unreasonable, the full threat of tort damages remains as a disincentive. 117 Other
defendants are not relieved of full scale tort liability unless they earn that relief
through promptly reimbursing an injured victim's otherwise unmet economic
losses. 118 The plan thus permits some of the tort law's strengths to
function-forcing those arguably at fault to bear substantial burdens for
injuries inflicted.
IV.
Despite its author's suggestion, Medical Malpractice and the American Jury
does not demonstrate that further efforts at fundamental medical malpractice
reform are unnecessary. On the contrary, as the Harvard study shows, despite
huge transaction costs and almost endless deliberations, there are huge
numbers of patients each year who suffer negligent medical treatment without
compensation, as well as huge numbers of patients who receive monetary

1 7

1 See id. at 887-88, discussing the important need to retain the threat of non-economic
damages in certain circumstances to deter egregious conduct.
118

For the terms of a bill (not limited to medical malpractice) implementing the early
104th Cong. (1996). For an earlier version (applicable only
to federally funded health care recipients), see S. 1960, 99th Cong. (1985) reprinted in
131 Cong. Rec. S. 17765 (daily ed., Dec. 17, 1985).

offers proposal, see S. 1861,
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rewards from doctors who did not injure them.11 9 This misdirection of
resources costs all of us billions in higher insurance premiums and defensive
medicine costs. Rather than preserve a grossly inefficient system which
perpetuates these kinds of inequities, we should turn away from the present
system-even if, as Neil Vidmar argues, we acquit the jury of malpractice.

119Note that Vidmar himself admits such defects in the tort system. See Vidmar, supra
note 12, at 60: "Overall, the discovery process is expensive and time consuming."
Likewise, he states: "The litigation process is also expensive." Id. As to earlier writing,
see VIDMAR, supra note 80, at 1220. In that article, Vidmar points to "other factors" than
jury bias to explain tort law's inconsistency and unpredictability, but we emphasize that
these other factors are themselves indictments of tort law as a woefully inadequate
system of compensation, deterrence, or corrective justice. For example, in an attempt to
explain away that blacks and women do not fare well in their treatment from juries in
Cook County and San Francisco, Vidmar points to "other factors" such as the fact that
"blacks may retain less competent lawyers, blacks may not be able to afford the economic
or other experts to demonstrate liability or the costs of their injury, and blacks may have
lower incomes and therefore cannot demonstrate economic losses as large as those of
whites." VIDMaR, supra note 12, at 1220. Even if we grant Vidmar's point, that "jurors
may be responding to different evidence and the quality of the evidence and arguments
rather than engaging in discrimination," id., we ought not fail to notice that our very
expensive tort system itself is guilty of discrimination. Surely, there is a corielation
between one's inability to play very expensive legal games and one's need for prompt
compensation for injury. As for tort law's more regressive nature in contrast to no-fault,
see Jeffrey O'Connell ET AL., The ComparativeCosts of Allowing Consumer Choice ForAuto
InsuranceIn All Fifty States, 55 MD. L. REv. 160,175-77 (1996). In the same article, Vidmar
suggests that "[als a result of black's [sic] lesser wealth, they may have greater needs for
immediate money, and thus plaintiffs settle for less money rather than face trial."
VIDMAR, supra note 12, at 1220 note 82. For Vidmar, this offers a "selection confound,"
ostensibly absolving juries of bias. Id. But that defendants can use the complexity and
dilatory nature or the tort system to coerce those most desperately in need to accept
especially inadequate compensation condemns the tort system itself, does it not? See also
supra note 80.

